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 Antoine Norman appeals the denial of his Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for a new 
trial.  We will affirm. 
2 
 
 As we write primarily for the parties, and as Norman’s direct appeal is currently 
pending before a Panel of this Court,1 we need not engage in a lengthy recitation of the 
facts.  Norman, a federal prisoner serving a sentence of incarceration at FCI Fort Dix, 
moved for a new trial on September 3, 2010.  He alleged that Postal Inspector Khary 
Freeland testified inconsistently and falsely when he said that he participated in a 
November 8, 2005 search of Rah’s Fashion Boutique—an inconsistency revealed by 
comparing Inspector Freeland’s grand-jury testimony with the trial testimony of FBI 
Agent Andrew Rixham.2
                                                 
1 See C.A. Nos. 08-1658 and 08-3876. 
  Norman charged that “[a]t no juncture of the pre-trial or trial 
proceedings did the prosecution disclose information to any of the defense counsel that 
Inspector Freeland had testified untruthfully at the Grand Jury proceedings,” which had 
the effect of “depriv[ing him] of his constitutional right to a fair trial.”  If “evidence of 
Inspector Freeland’s prior fallaciousness under oath had been disclosed, such information 
would have provided defense counsel with an extremely more effective means by which 
to question the reliability of the summaries and charts prepared by Inspector Freeland and 
enabled counsel to further argue . . . the prior dishonesty of the Inspector,” who played an 
“integral role” in the Government’s case and in gathering its evidence.  
 
2 We observe that the trial testimony attached by Norman to his motion does not appear 
to be from Norman’s own trial, but from an otherwise-unrelated trial against one of his 
codefendents, Akintunde Crawford.  See E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 06-234; see also Gov’t’s 




 The District Court denied the motion on the merits,3 determining that Norman 
could not “establish several of the factors in the Third Circuit’s five[-]factor test” for 
Rule 33 relief.  United States v. Norman, No. 06–377–4, 2011 WL 5022828, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 18, 2011).4
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
  Specifically, Norman failed to show that the “new” evidence was 
not “cumulative or impeaching,” that the evidence was material, or that the evidence 
would be likely to produce an acquittal.  Id. at *2–3.  Norman filed an untimely notice of 
appeal, in which he claimed to have received the District Court’s order on October 25, 
2011.  
5
                                                 
3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1) provides that a District Court “may not grant a motion for a 
new trial” if an appeal is pending.  However, a District Court may deny the motion on the 
merits, even if the notice of appeal has already been filed.  See United States v. Cronic, 
466 U.S. 648, 667 n.42 (1984); Gov’t of V.I. v. Joseph, 685 F.2d 857, 863 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1982); see also United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 77 (1st Cir. 1995) (describing 
process of District Court adjudication of Rule 33 motions when appeal is pending). 
  Our review of the denial of a 
 
4 “(a) [T]he evidence must be in fact, newly discovered, i.e., discovered since the trial; (b) 
facts must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the movant; 
(c) the evidence relied on, must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be 
material to the issues involved; and (e) it must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a 
new trial, the newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal.”  United 
States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).  As the test is 
conjunctive, failure to satisfy a single prong “is a sufficient basis to deny a motion for a 
new trial.”  United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir. 2002).  
 
5 Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) is not jurisdictional, so Norman’s untimely filing of his notice of 
appeal (assuming arguendo that he is unable to show entitlement to tolling under one of 
the various applicable rules) does not deprive us of the power to review.  See Gov’t of 
V.I. v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 328 (3d Cir. 2010).  Thus, much as the District Court was 
able to reach the merits of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion in order to deny it, we may 
evaluate the merit of this appeal without first deciding the issue of timeliness.  Cf. 
4 
 
motion for a new trial is for abuse of discretion, bearing in mind that such motions are not 
favored and should be granted in exceptional cases only.  United States v. Silveus, 542 
F.3d 993, 1005 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).  A District Court abuses its discretion 
when “its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of 
law or an improper application of law to fact.”  United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 
511 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002)).   
 Upon review of the record, we determine that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding Norman’s new-trial motion to be inadequate.  We agree with its 
application of our five-factor test, and for substantially the same reasons it identified 
below, we conclude that the motion fails the materiality, impeachment, and acquittal bars.  
Therefore, as this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Knapper v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Knapper), 407 F.3d 573, 580 n.15 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(court must determine jurisdictional issues before reaching the merits).  
